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Abstract
The workflow satisfiability problem is the problem of finding an assignment of users to tasks
(i.e., a plan) so that all authorization constraints are satisfied. The workflow resiliency problem
is a dynamic workflow satisfiability problem coping with the absence of users. If a workflow is
resilient, it is of course satisfiable, but the vice versa does not hold. There are three levels of
resiliency: in static resiliency, up to k users might be absent before the execution starts and never
become available for that execution; in decremental resiliency, up to k users might be absent
before or during execution and, again, they never become available for that execution; in dynamic
resiliency, up to k users might be absent before executing any task and they may in general turn
absent and available continuously, before or during the execution. Much work has been carried
out to address static resiliency, little for decremental resiliency and, to the best of our knowledge,
for dynamic resiliency no exact approach that returns a dynamic execution plan if and only if
a workflow is resilient has been provided so far. In this paper, we tackle workflow resiliency via
extended game automata. We provide three encodings (having polynomial-time complexity) from
workflows to extended game automata to model each kind of resiliency as an instantaneous game
and we use Uppaal-TIGA to synthesize a winning strategy (i.e., a controller) for such a game.
If a controller exists, then the workflow is resilient (as the controller’s strategy corresponds to
a dynamic plan). If it doesn’t, then the workflow is breakable. The approach that we propose is
correct because it corresponds to a reachability problem for extended game automata (TCTL
model checking). Moreover, we have developed Erre, the first tool for workflow resiliency that
relies on a controller synthesis approach for the three kinds of resiliency. Thanks to Erre, our
approach is thus also fully-automated from analysis to simulation.
1 Introduction
1.1 Context and Motivation
Workflow technology has emerged as one of the leading technologies for modeling, (re)designing
and executing business processes in several different application domains such as industrial R&D,
manufacturing, energy distribution, banking processes, critical infrastructures and healthcare [1, 2].
A workflow is the automation of a business process, in whole or part, during which documents,
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information or tasks are passed from one participant to another for action, according to a set of
procedural rules. The conceptual modeling of workflows underlying business processes has been
receiving increasing attention over the last years and many technical aspects have been discussed,
including flexibility, structured vs. unstructured modeling, change management, authorization
models, temporal features, resource allocation and constraints (see, e.g., [1, 3, 4, 5, 6]).
In such contexts, attention must especially be devoted to the resources (users, machineries,
computational devices, etc.) employed in such workflows. Regarding resource allocation, workflows
can be divided into (i) workflows where the availability of users is controlled (no one is assumed
to become absent) and (ii) workflows where the availability of users is not controlled (sooner or
later a user may become absent). The first case, is the classic workflow satisfiability problem (WSP,
[4, 5]) in which it is enough to come up with an assignment of tasks to users (i.e., a plan) satisfying
the underlying constraint satisfaction problem [7]. In the second case, we must operate according
to the kind of uncertainty we are dealing with to keep guaranteeing that the security policies we
expect to hold will never be broken. For example, conditional uncertainty models workflows where
we cannot decide which conditional path to take during execution, whereas resource uncertainty
models workflows where the availability of resources is unknown during execution.
Specifically, to guarantee a successful task to user assignment under conditional uncertainty that
always satisfies a given set of security policies in [8, 9] we build on [6] to provide constraint networks
under conditional uncertainty (CNCUs) as an extension of classic constraint networks (CNs, [7]).
CNCUs address natively conditional uncertainty by means of observation points in the workflow
allowing us to observe the uncontrollable behavior (of the environment) revealing in real time which
workflow path the execution will go through. Since the choice of the workflow path to take is out of
control (and only revealed during execution) the same tasks may in general be assigned to different
users depending on what is going on. In such a context, the classic workflow satisfiability does
fail because the synthesized plan it relies on is fixed and unable to handle conditional assignments
leading to eventually break a subset of the security policies we expect to hold.
Consider now an unconditional workflow in which the availability of users is out of control.
What can go wrong?
Some users might wake up feeling sick and call in to say that they are not going to come to work.
Other users could be involved in a traffic jam on their way to work or simply decide to go on strike.
In such a case, we must guarantee a successful execution with the only remaining users who agree
not to leave until the workflow completes.
Are we safe now?
No, we are not. The situation could get worse than the previous one. Some of the users (with
which the execution started) might get a call announcing an emergency in the family. In such a
case, we must guarantee a successful execution with, again, the only remaining users who might,
this time, leave before the workflow completes.
Are we safe now?
Still, no. We could have our worst day ever. Some users might not arrive in time at work or might
not arrive at all. Others could leave before the workflow ends and never come back in time to
finish the work they started. Others could be absent for a short period of time (e.g., to go to the
doctor to collect some medical prescriptions). And so on. In such a case, we must guarantee that
2
before executing any task we have enough users left to keep executing the tasks until the workflow
completes.
Now we are safe.
The previous three examples provide the intuitions behind the three main kinds of workflow re-
siliency defined by Wang and Li in [5] (initially in [4]):
• Static resiliency is when users are absent before starting and do not come back (as in the
first scenario above).
• Decremental resiliency is when they can also become absent during execution but, again, they
do not come back (second scenario).
• Dynamic resiliency is when (possibly different sets of) users can become and stay absent for
any (possibly big) time interval; they can also come back and become absent over and over
again (third scenario).
Some works have addressed workflow resiliency probabilistically, e.g., [10, 11], whereas other
works addressed it by modifying the constraints, e.g., [12, 13]. Several approaches consider static
resiliency only (e.g., [14, 15, 16]), one of them also considers decremental resiliency [16], whereas, to
the best of our knowledge, an exact approach to dynamic resiliency (i.e., an approach that returns
a dynamic execution plan if and only if a workflow is resilient without modifying the problem nor
returning an execution plan that may fail) remains unexplored; see also [17] for a very recent survey
on workflow satisfiability and resiliency.
1.2 Contributions
We address dynamic resiliency (and therefore also static and decremental resiliency) by moving our
analysis from satisfiability to controllability. Our contributions in this paper are three-fold.
1. We provide three encodings into extended game automata to model static, decremental and
dynamic resiliency (up to maximum k absent users) as two-player games, and we discuss how
to get dynamic plans (or prove that none exists) for each kind of resiliency via controller
synthesis by using Uppaal-TIGA. In each encoding the maximum number of absent users
is given as input. For static resiliency we aim to synthesize a plan saying how to execute
the workflow depending on which subset of users is absent before starting the execution.
For decremental resiliency the plan would also tackle users that might turn absent during
execution, whereas for dynamic resiliency the plan deals with users that (possibly) come and
go before the execution of any task.
2. We prove: the correctness of the encodings, that these encodings are realizable in polynomial
time and that dynamic resiliency is a matter of order.
3. We introduce Erre, a tool that we have developed to automate and carry out an initial
experimental evaluation and we discuss how we generated the related set of benchmarks.
Erre is the first tool for workflow resiliency that relies on a controller synthesis approach for
the three kinds of resiliency.
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ProcR
{alice, bob, charlie}
+
Log
{david, emma}
PrepC
{bob, david, emma}
+ Sign
{frank, grace}
¬Relatives
6= ∧ ¬Relatives
6=
¬Relatives
Figure 1: A simplification of a loan origination process. Solid edges model the partial order between
tasks, whereas dashed ones model authorization constraints.
1.3 Organization
Section 2 introduces a motivating example that we use throughout the paper. Section 3 provides
essential background on extended game automata as well as workflow satisfiability and resiliency.
Section 4 provides the encodings from workflows into extended game automata for static, decre-
mental and dynamic resiliency as well as the related controller synthesis phase to get dynamic
plans. Section 5 discusses the correctness and complexity of the encodings provided in Section 4.
Section 6 presents our tool Erre, along with an experimental evaluation (Erre is currently the
only tool able to tackle all kinds of resiliency in an exact way). Section 7 discusses related work.
Section 8 sums up and discusses future work.
2 A Motivating Example
As a motivating example, we consider a simplification of a loan origination process (LOP) for
eligible customers whose financial records have already been approved. We show the workflow in
Figure 1 and we recall that separation of duty requires that the users executing a subset of tasks
are different, whereas binding of duties requires that the users executing a subset of tasks are equal.
For our example all separations of duty involve two tasks only.
The workflow starts with a pre-processing clerk (alice or bob or charlie), who processes a loan
request (ProcR). After that, the flow of execution splits unconditionally (leftmost diamond labeled
by +) and enters a parallel block, where an auditor (david or emma), who must not be a relative
of the user who executed ProcR, logs the just processed request for future accountability purposes
(Log). Simultaneously, a post-processing clerk (bob or david or emma), who must be different from
and not a relative of the user who executed ProcR and also different from the user who executed
(or will execute) Log, prepares the contract (PrepC). The order of Log and PrepC does not matter.
Finally, the flow of execution joins and exits the parallel block (rightmost diamond labeled by +)
where a manager (frank or grace), who must not be a relative of the user who executed PrepC,
signs the contract (Sign). Note that some users may belong to more than one role (e.g., bob is
both a pre-processing and a post-processing clerk). In Figure 1 directed edges model the partial
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order among tasks, whereas undirected dashed edges model authorization constraints. We show
authorized users below tasks. For the sake of the example, bob and david are brothers, whereas
emma is frank’s daughter.
Our goal is to always execute this workflow satisfying all authorization constraints in particular
when some users are or will potentially become absent during execution.
3 Background
In this section, we first summarize workflow satisfiability and resiliency and then we summarize
deterministic finite automata (DFAs) [18], game automata (GAs) and their extensions to support
(bounded) integer variables: extended game automata (EGAs). EGAs are the fragment of extended
timed game automata [19] in which data variables are restricted to be of integer type and time
aspects are neglected (see, for example, the discussion in [20, 21] for a definition of extended timed
game automata).
3.1 Workflow Satisfiability and Resiliency
The core of a workflow defines a set of tasks and a partial-order relation saying in which order such
tasks have to be executed. An access-controlled workflow extends a classic workflow by adding
a set of users, an authorization relation and a set of constraints saying which combinations of
task assignments to users are permitted [4, 5]. In this paper we give a specification of access
controlled workflow whose set of constraints consists of entailment and counting constraints [22].
More formally,
Definition 1. An access-controlled workflow (ACWF) is a tuple W = 〈T,U,, A,C〉, where:
1. T = {t1, . . . , tn} is a finite set of tasks (atomic work units).
2. U = {u1, . . . , um} is a finite set of users (the resources to commit for executing tasks).
3. ⊆ T × T is a partial-order relation. If (t1, t2) ∈ (or simply t1  t2), then t1 is executed
before t2. Tasks t1 and t2 may be executed simultaneously if neither t1  t2 nor t2  t1 are
specified.
4. A ⊆ T ×U is the authorization relation. We abuse notation and write A(t) = {u | (t, u) ∈ A}
to shorten the set of users authorized for t.
5. C is a set of entailment and counting constraints. An entailment constraint has the form
(ρ, T1, T2), where ρ ⊆ U×U and T1, T2 ⊆ T and it is a binary relational constraint between the
authorized users of two tasks. A counting constraint has the form (x, y, T1), where x, y ∈ N,
0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ |T1| and T1 ⊆ T and it is a cardinality constraint imposing a minimum (x) and
a maximum (y) number of tasks a user u ∈ U can be assigned if u executes some t ∈ T1. 
Entailment constraints are basically a kind of relational constraint and divide in three main
types:
Type 1: when |T1| = |T2| = 1
Type 2: when |T1| = 1 and |T2| > 1
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Type 3: when |T1| > 1 and |T2| > 1
Counting constraints are basically cardinality constraints and are sometimes a compact way to
encode certain entailment constraints.
Example 1. Let 6= be defined as {(u1, u2) | u1, u2 ∈ U ∧ u1 6= u2} and = as {(u1, u2) | u1, u2 ∈
U ∧ u1 = u2}, then the entailment constraints (6=, {t1}, {t2}) and (=, {t1}, {t2}) are equivalent to
the counting constraints (1, 1, {t1, t2}) and (2, 2, {t1, t2}) modeling a separation and a binding of
duties, respectively (to understand why see the satisfaction of constraints below). More concretely,
consider Figure 1 and its formal specification in Example 3. We model the dashed edge between
ProcR and PrepC labeled by “6= ∧¬Relatives” with a counting (left) plus an entailment constraint
(right) as follows:
6= ∧ ¬Relatives
becomes
(1, 1, {ProcR, PrepC})︸ ︷︷ ︸
Counting constraint
plus (¬Relatives, {ProcR}, {PrepC})︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entailment constraint

A plan says how a workflow is executed, i.e., which tasks are assigned to which users. Formally:
Definition 2. A plan is a mapping pi : T → U assigning tasks to users. A plan pi
• is authorized for a workflow 〈T,U,, A,C〉 if pi(t) ∈ A(t) (i.e., (t, pi(t)) ∈ A) for every t ∈ T ;
• satisfies an entailment constraint (ρ, T1, T2) if there exist t1 ∈ T1 and t2 ∈ T2 such that
(pi(t1), pi(t2)) ∈ ρ;
• satisfies a counting constraint (x, y, T1) if any user who executes some tasks in T1, executes
from x to y (different) tasks in that set (the constraint is trivially satisfied for all users not
executing any task in T1);
• is consistent if it is authorized and satisfies all constraints. 
Example 2. Continuing Example 1, the constraint (1, 1, {t1, t2}) says that if a user executes some
t ∈ {t1, t2}, then he must execute exactly 1 task (separation of duty), whereas the constraint
(2, 2, {t1, t2}) says that if a user executes some t ∈ {t1, t2}, then he must execute exactly 2 tasks
(all) in {t1, t2} (binding of duties). Once again, getting back to Figure 1 and Example 2 the counting
constraint (1, 1, {ProcR, PrepC}) says that any user authorized for ProcR and PrepC does not execute
both tasks. Consider alice, charlie, david and emma. Each of these users is authorized either for
ProcR or for PrepC, therefore, each user can execute at most one task. Instead, bob is authorized
for both. Therefore, either bob doesn’t execute ProcR nor PrepC, or bob must execute only one of
them (no matter which one). 
Definition 3. An ACWF is satisfiable if there exists a total ordering on the tasks meeting the
restrictions imposed by  (topological sort) and a consistent plan for it. 
Example 3. The formal specification of the ACWF in Figure 1 is
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1. T = {ProcR, Log, PrepC, Sign}.
2. U = {alice, bob, charlie, david, emma, frank, grace}.
3. ProcR  Log, ProcR  PrepC, Log  Sign, PrepC  Sign.
4. A(ProcR) = {alice, bob, charlie}, A(Log) = {david, emma}, A(PrepC) = {bob, david, emma}
and A(Sign) = {frank, grace}.1
5. C = {(¬Relatives, {ProcR}, {Log}), (¬Relatives, {ProcR}, {PrepC}), (¬Relatives, {PrepC}, {Sign}),
(1, 1, {ProcR, PrepC}), (1, 1, {Log, PrepC})}.
where ¬Relatives is denoted as U × U \ {(bob, david), (david, bob), (emma, frank), (frank, emma)},
whereas the counting constraints model (in a compact form) the various separation of duty discussed
in Section 2. The first three entailment constraints in C refer to the dashed edges between ProcR
and Log (whole label), ProcR and PrepC (second part of the label) and PrepC and Sign (whole
label) in Figure 1, respectively. The last two refer to the dashed edges between ProcR and PrepC
(first part of the label) and Log and PrepC (whole label) in Figure 1, respectively.
The workflow in Figure 1 is satisfiable. A possible total ordering is
ProcR  Log  PrepC  Sign
and a consistent plan is
pi(ProcR) = alice, pi(Log) = david, pi(PrepC) = bob, pi(Sign) = frank,
meaning that alice processes the request, david logs it, bob prepares the contract and frank signs
it. 
Workflow satisfiability assumes that all users are always available (that’s why a static plan is
enough). However, when the availability of users is uncertain, workflow satisfiability is not enough
to guarantee that a consistent plan will never break any security policy. In such a case, we need
to understand if the workflow is resilient. Indeed, workflow resiliency calls for the synthesis of
dynamic plans whose assignments of tasks to users are done dynamically while the workflow is
being executed according to which users are available and which ones are absent. More technically,
let U be the set of users, |U | the number of users in U and k the maximum number of absent users,
where k ∈ N and 0 ≤ k < |U |. If k = 0, then no user is (or will become) absent. Otherwise, up
to k-users are (or will become) absent before or during execution. These users can also remain
absent or come back according to the type of resiliency. The analysis obviously does not make
sense for k = |U |: the workflow is trivially not resilient because the strategy of the environment is
“make all users absent and don’t do anything else” (that’s why this case is excluded). The analysis
makes sense when k < |U |, where the special case k = 0 boils down to WSP. In dynamic resiliency,
different subsets of users might be absent at different points of the execution. k indicates that
any subset U ′ ⊂ U of absent users (no matter which one and at which point of the execution) has
cardinality 0 ≤ |U ′| ≤ k < |U |. As a result, U \ U ′ represents the set of available users (however,
this does not imply that all A(T ) 6= ∅ once k users are made absent).
In [4, 5], Wang and Li defined three levels of resiliency:
1More formally, A = {(ProcR, alice), (ProcR, bob), (ProcR, charlie), (Log, david), (Log, emma), (PrepC, bob),
(PrepC, david), (PrepC, emma), (Sign, frank), (Sign, grace)}.
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Algorithm 1: StaticResiliency
Input: W = 〈T,U,, A,C〉 and 0 ≤ k < |U |
Output: Resilient if W is statically resilient up to k absent users. Breakable otherwise.
1 The environment chooses Absent ⊂ U such that |Absent| ≤ k
2 U ← U \ Absent
3 if there exists a total ordering on tasks and a consistent plan pi for W then
4 return Resilient . controller wins
5 return Breakable . environment wins
Algorithm 2: DecrementalResiliency
Input: W = 〈T,U,, A,C〉 and 0 ≤ k < |U |
Output: Resilient if W is decrementally resilient up to k absent users. Breakable otherwise.
1 Absent← ∅
2 pi ← initial plan
3 Executed← ∅
4 while Executed 6= T do
5 The environment chooses U ′ ⊂ U such that |U ′ ∪ Absent| ≤ k
6 Absent← Absent ∪ U ′
7 U ← U \ Absent
8 The controller looks for t ∈ T \ Executed (coherent with  in the current execution) and u ∈ U
such that (t, u) ∈ A and pi ∪ {pi(t) = u} belongs to a possible consistent plan
9 if no pair (t, u) exists then
10 return Breakable . environment wins
11 pi ← pi ∪ {pi(t) = u}
12 Executed← Executed ∪ {t}
13 return Resilient . controller wins
1. Static resiliency : up to k < |U | users might be absent before the execution of the workflow
starts and these users will never become available for that execution.
2. Decremental resiliency : up to k < |U | users might be absent before execution or become
so during it. As in the static case, absent users will never become available again for that
execution.
3. Dynamic resiliency : up to k < |U | (possibly different) users might be absent before executing
any task. These users may become absent and become available again (possibly) many times
(i.e., they come and go).
As is evident (and shown more formally in [4, 5]), dynamic resiliency entails decremental resiliency,
which entails static resiliency.
Each of these levels of resiliency can be seen as a two-player game where a controller dynamically
generates an ordering and a plan pi (such that the ordering will be total and coherent with  and
the plan consistent at the end of the execution), while the environment makes users absent in order
to break consistency of pi. If the controller wins the game, then the workflow is resilient, whereas if
it loses, then the workflow is breakable as the environment has a strategy to break any potentially
consistent pi. Of course, when the number of absent users is k = 0, all three levels of resiliency boil
down to classic workflow satisfiability (as all users are available).
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Algorithm 3: DynamicResiliency
Input: W = 〈T,U,, A,C〉 and 0 ≤ k < |U |
Output: Resilient if W is dynamically resilient up to k absent users. Breakable otherwise.
1 pi ← initial plan
2 Executed← ∅
3 while Executed 6= T do
4 The environment chooses Absent ⊂ U such that |Absent| ≤ k
5 U ′ ← U \ Absent
6 The controller looks for t ∈ T \ Executed (coherent with  in the current execution) and u ∈ U ′
such that (t, u) ∈ A and pi ∪ {pi(t) = u} belongs to a possible consistent plan
7 if no pair (t, u) exists then
8 return Breakable . environment wins
9 pi ← pi ∪ {pi(t) = u}
10 Executed← Executed ∪ {t}
11 return Resilient . controller wins
Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 summarize the formalizations of the games proposed
by Wang and Li in [4, 5] to model static, decremental and dynamic resiliency.
Wang and Li also proved (with respect to their specification) that deciding workflow satisfiability
is NP-hard, deciding static resiliency is in coNPNP, whereas deciding decremental and dynamic
resiliency is PSPACE-complete [5]. Recently, Fong proved that deciding static resiliency is coNPNP-
complete [23].
The workflow in Figure 1 is statically, decrementally and dynamically resilient up to k = 1 (see
the discussion in Section 6).
3.2 Extended Game Automata
Deterministic finite automata (DFAs, [18]) are the core of many modern state-transition systems
that have pervasively become part of our life such as light switches, gate remotes, washing machines,
various hardware components in modern computers and many other computational devices. DFAs
allow for the specification of an abstract system whose behavior is defined according to a finite
set of possible states and a finite set of transitions regulating the evolution of the system (i.e., the
changing of state) according to the provided permitted actions that were decided as design time.
For instance, flicking a light switch may result in either turning on or off the light depending on
the previous state of the system.
However, DFAs fail to model systems dealing with uncontrollable actions (i.e., actions carried
out by the environment). To overcome this limitation, game automata (GA, [24]) extended classic
DFAs by dividing the set of transitions into controllable and uncontrollable. Controllable transitions
are assigned to a controller (us), whereas uncontrollable transitions are assigned to the environment.
In any state of the GA, both players are not obliged to play, i.e., take one of their transitions (if
any). Conversely, when there exists a state from which both of them decide to take a transition,
the environment plays first as uncontrollable transitions have priority over controllable ones (this
is inherited from the semantics of timed game automata [19]). Taking an uncontrollable transition
results in ignoring the controllable one that the controller decided to take (if it meant to play
in that state). The purpose of the controller is to reach an accepting state, whereas that of the
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environment is to prevent the controller from doing so. An accepting state (also known as final
state) is a state of the automaton that, if reached, implies that the sequence of transitions taken to
go from the initial state to it forms a word belonging to the language accepted by the automaton.
Therefore, in order to get to one of the accepting states we need something more than a mere
sequence of transitions, we need a strategy : a mapping from states to controllable transitions
guaranteeing that, if followed, we will eventually end up in one of the accepting states.
However, GAs do not model games which also consider integer variables and operations on
them that may appear in the guards and/or updates of transitions. To achieve this purpose, we
consider a fragment of timed game automata extended with integer variables discussed in [21,
25, 20, 26]. We refer to this fragment as extended game automata (EGAs). Recall that when
adding integer variables to GAs and operations on them (such as sum, subtraction, multiplication,
divisions, Boolean comparison etc.), decidability of model checking does not break provided that
these variables are bounded (i.e., their domains are finite) [21, 25, 20, 26].
In [21, 25, 20, 26] there is no clear consensus on the formal definition of EGAs, so, as a minor
contribution, we provide in this paper a possible formal definition that contains just what we need.
To that end, given a finite set of integer variables I in which each variable i ∈ I has a finite domain
dom(i) = {i1, i2, . . . } ⊂ Z (with i1, i2,. . . integer constants), let Γ = {a 7→ a, b 7→ b, . . . } be a set
of variable assignments to all integer variables in I where a ∈ dom(a), b ∈ dom(b) and let Γ∗ be the
set of all possible combination of value assignments. Note that since I is finite and any i ∈ I has
a finite domain dom(i), we have that Γ∗ is finite as well.
Definition 4. An extended game automaton (EGA) is a tuple 〈L,Σ, I, δ, q0,Γ0, F 〉, where:
1. L = {`0, `1, . . . } is a finite set of locations.
2. Σ = {a, b, . . . } is a finite set of input symbols modeling the possible actions.
3. I = {i, . . . } is a finite set of integer variables each one with an associated bounded domain
dom(i), . . . .
4. δ ⊆ L×G×Σ×V ×L is a partial function representing the transition relation, where G is a
Boolean expression involving conjunctions, disjunctions, negations and parenthesization and
whose atoms have the form i ∼ c where i ∈ I, c is a constant and ∼∈ {<,>,=, 6=,≥,≤}, Σ
is a set of input symbols and V is a (possibly empty) sequence of variable assignments i :=
i∗c+d, where i ∈ I and c, d are integer constants. For any 〈`i, G, a, {i1 := i1∗c1+d1, i2 :=
i2 ∗ c2 + d2, . . . }, `j〉, if the guard G is true, the EGA can move from `i to `j by evolving
the current Γ into Γ′ according to the assignments i1 := i1 ∗ c1 + d1, i2 := i2 ∗ c2 + d2, . . .
(considered in this order) realizing action a. Again, transitions are divided in controllable and
uncontrollable with uncontrollable transitions having priority over controllable ones.
5. `0 ∈ L is the initial location.
6. Γ0 = {a 7→ a, b 7→ b, . . . } ∈ Γ∗ represents the initialization of all integer variables in I.
7. F ⊆ L is the set of accepting locations.
A state of an EGA is a pair (`,Γ), where ` ∈ L and Γ ∈ Γ∗. 
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`0start `1
〈i < −4 ∨ i = 0, b, {i := i+ 12}〉 〈i 6= −2, c, {i := i− 7}〉
〈i ≥ 10, a, {i := 100}〉
〈i ≥ 4 ∧ i ≤ 6, d, {}〉
Figure 2: Controllable Extended Game Automata. Solid edges (green) model controllable transi-
tions, whereas dashed ones (red) uncontrollable ones.
We graphically represent an EGA as a (multi)graph where the set of nodes coincides with L and
the set of edges is such that there exists an edge `i → `j labeled by 〈g, a, v〉 for each (`i, g, a, v, `j) ∈ δ.
A (memoryless) execution strategy (or positional strategy) for an EGA is a partial function
σ : L× Γ∗ → δ telling the controller which transition to take depending on the current state (`,Γ).
Once again, for the purpose of this paper, an EGA is controllable if there exists a winning strategy
that guarantees the controller to always reach an accepting location.
Example 4. Figure 2 shows an example of EGA with two locations L = {`0, `1} (with `0 initial
and F = {`1}), one integer variable I = {i} having domain dom(i) = {x | −100 ≤ x ≤ 100}
and such that Γ0 = {i 7→ 0}, an uncontrollable transition τ1 and three controllable ones τ2, τ3, τ4
specified as follows:
τ1: 〈`0, i ≥ 10, a, {i := 100}, `0〉 meaning if the current location is `0 and i ≥ 10, then realize
action a incrementing i by 100 and remaining in `0.
τ2: 〈`0, i < −4 ∨ i = 0, b, {i := i + 12}, `0〉 meaning if the current location is `0 and i < 10 or
i = 0, then realize action b incrementing i by 12 and remaining in `0.
τ3: 〈`0, i 6= −2, c, {i := i − 7}, `0〉 meaning if the current location is `0 and i 6= −2, then realize
action c decrementing i by 7 and remaining in `0.
τ4: 〈`0, i ≥ 4 ∧ i ≤ 6, d, {}, `1〉 meaning if the current location is `0 and i ≥ 4 and i ≤ 6, then
realize action d without updating any integer variable and enter `1.
The EGA is controllable. To prove that consider the following strategy
σ(`0, {i 7→ 0}) = τ3 σ(`0, {i 7→ −7}) = τ2 σ(`0, {i 7→ 5}) = τ4
This strategy says that in (`0, {i 7→ 0}) the controller must take τ3 to move to (`0, {i 7→ −7}) (i.e.,
to remain in `0 decrementing i by 7). Then, in (`0, {i 7→ −7}) the strategy says to take τ2 to move
to (`0, {i 7→ 5}) (i.e., to remain in `0 incrementing i by 12). Finally, in (`0, {i 7→ 5}) it says to
take τ4 to move to (`1, {i 7→ 5}) and win the game.
Yet, one could wonder if in (`0, {i 7→ 0} we could have taken τ2 to get to (`0, {i 7→ 12}), then
τ3 to get to (`0, {i 7→ 5}) and finally τ4 to move to (`1, {i 7→ 5}). That is, one could wonder if the
strategy
σ′(`0, {i 7→ 0}) = τ2 σ′(`0, {i 7→ 12}) = τ3 σ′(`0, {i 7→ 5}) = τ4
would have been another winning strategy. The answer is no and the reason is that σ′ does not
guarantee to reach q1 because in (`0, {i 7→ 12}) the environment can take τ1 which, having priority,
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moves to (`0, {i 7→ 100}) from which no controllable transition can be taken to get to `1. Likewise,
the EGA in Figure 2 turns uncontrollable if τ1 is modified into τ
′
1 : 〈`0, i ≥ 0, a, {i := 100}, `0〉
since the environment can take τ ′1 in (`0, {i 7→ 0}) moving to (`0, {i 7→ 100}) because, again,
uncontrollable transitions go first. 
In this paper, we are only interested in this kind of (pure) reachability games (i.e., getting to
some accepting state) and we rely on Uppaal-TIGA [25] as an off the shelf model checker for
extended (timed) game automata in order to synthesize the strategies we need, or to prove that
none exists by synthesizing the environment’s. In Uppaal-TIGA, we can specify queries in timed
computation tree logic (TCTL), an extension of CTL [27] supporting time which was proposed
in [28]. Although we don’t need time aspects in this paper, we rely on this software anyway as
untimed games are a particular case of timed games in which time aspects can be neglected and
also because Uppaal-TIGA is a state of the art tool. Therefore, when synthesizing strategies (i.e.,
controllers) for such two-player games we will be always model checking our EGAs against TCTL
formulae having the simple form
A♦(qi ∨ · · · ∨ qj) ,
where {`i, . . . , `j} = F . That is, in all paths (i.e., possible different runs of the game) the controller
eventually reaches an accepting state (`,Γ) such that ` ∈ F (i.e., it always eventually wins the
game).
4 Workflow Resiliency via EGAs
In this section, we address all three kinds of resiliency. We provide three encodings from ACWFs
into EGAs to check static, decremental and dynamic resiliency and we start by discussing the core
components. These encodings are similar and, of course, that for dynamic resiliency subsumes that
for decremental resiliency, which in turn, subsumes that for static resiliency. There is of course
value in describing each of them individually because, for example, we cannot use the encoding
for dynamic resiliency to focus on decremental or static resiliency only since a decrementally or
statically resilient ACWF might not be dynamically resilient (so a “no” answer for dynamic would
wrongly result in a “no” answer for decremental and static resiliency).
4.1 Core Encoding
Consider an arbitrary ACWF 〈T,U,, A,C〉. The core of the EGA consists of three locations:
Turn1 (initial) modeling the environment’s turn, Turn2 modeling the controller’s and Res (accepting
location) which, if reached, implies resiliency of the ACWF.
We map each user u ∈ U into a unique incremental integer constant u starting from 1, and
we model each task t ∈ T as an integer variable t having bounded domain dom(t) = {0, . . . , |U |},
where t = 0 means that t has not been assigned yet and t = u means that pi(t) = u. Initially, all
t variables are initialized to 0 (as all tasks are unexecuted). We model the availability of users as
a set of variables {au | u ∈ U} each one having bounded domain dom(au) = {0, 1}, where au = 1
means that u is available, whereas au = 0 means that u is absent. Initially all these variables are
set to 1 meaning that all users are available (so that the environment is free to remove anyone it
likes).
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Example 5. For our example, we map alice, bob, charlie, david, emma, frank and grace to
the integer constants 1, . . . , 7 and in the rest of the paper we write a, b, c, d, e, f and g to refer to
the integer constants representing these users. 
We also have an integer variable k (initialized to 0) having a bounded domain dom(k) =
{0, . . . , k}, where k is an integer constant representing the maximum number of absent users we
want to test the workflow for.
We map each counting constraint (x, y, T1) ∈ C into a unique incremental integer constant i
starting from 1.
Example 6. For our example, we have that (1, 1, {ProcR, PrepC}) = 1 and (1, 1, {Log, PrepC}) = 2
and we refer more intuitively to these constants as i1 and i2. 
For each counting constraint (x, y, T1) = i and user u ∈
⋃
t∈T1 A(t), we have an integer variable
ci,u having bounded domain dom(ci,u) = {0, . . . , |T1|} playing the role of a counter to keep track
of how many tasks t ∈ T1 are assigned to every user u who is authorized for some of them with
respect to the counting constraint (x, y, T1). All these variables are initialized to 0 and will play a
crucial role when checking the satisfaction of the corresponding counting constraint (see below).
Example 7. For our example, we have the counters ci1,a, ci1,b, ci1,c, ci1,d, ci1,e, ci2,b, ci2,d, ci2,e,
where, for instance, the counter ci2,d is the counter for david with respect to (1, 1, {Log, PrepC}).
Note that the encoding does not generate any counters for users who are not authorized for the
tasks in T1 of a counting constraint (x, y, T1), because those users will never execute any task in
T1. 
We check that all constraints are satisfied by means of a transition win to move from Turn2 to
Res whose guard and update are
〈Turn2, OVER ∧ SATE ∧ SATC, win, {}, Res〉
where the first part of the guard is
OVER :
∧
t∈T
t 6= 0
to check that each task has been assigned to a user. The second part of the guard is
SATE :
∧
(ρ,T1,T2)∈C
(⊥
∨
t1∈T1,
t2∈T2,
(u1,u2)∈ρ such that
u1∈A(t1)∧ t2∈A(t2)
(t1 = u1 ∧ t2 = u2))
where the part “such that u1 ∈ A(t1) ∧ t2 ∈ A(t2)” filters ρ so that the resulting disjuncts (t1 =
u1 ∧ t2 = u2) belong to valid plans only. SATE checks that all entailment constraints are satisfied2.
Finally, SATC does the same as SATE but with respect to counting constraints. More specifically,
to check the satisfaction of a counting constraint i we add several conjuncts to SATC to model
conditional constraints such as “if a user u executes some task in the subset of tasks of a given i,
then the corresponding counter ci,u must be ≥ x and ≤ y. In symbols,
t = u =⇒ (ci,u ≥ x ∧ ci,u ≤ y)
2The internal “⊥” in SATE serves to make the verification fail in case ρ = ∅ or T1 = ∅ or T2 = ∅.
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SATC is therefore the conjunction of these implications (rewritten as disjunctions) and has the
following compact form:
SATC :
∧
(x,y,T1)∈C,
t∈T1,u∈A(t)
(t 6= u ∨ (ci,u ≥ x ∧ ci,u ≤ y))
Example 8. For Figure 1 SATE and SATC are:
SATE : (⊥ ∨ (ProcR = b ∧ PrepC = b) ∨ (ProcR = c ∧ PrepC = b)∨
(ProcR = a ∧ PrepC = b) ∨ (ProcR = a ∧ PrepC = e) ∨ (ProcR = a ∧ PrepC = d)∨
(ProcR = c ∧ PrepC = e) ∨ (ProcR = b ∧ PrepC = e) ∨ (ProcR = c ∧ PrepC = d))
∧
(⊥ ∨ (ProcR = a ∧ Log = e) ∨ (ProcR = a ∧ Log = d) ∨ (ProcR = c ∧ Log = e)∨
(ProcR = b ∧ Log = e) ∨ (ProcR = c ∧ Log = d))
∧
(⊥ ∨ (PrepC = d ∧ Sign = f) ∨ (PrepC = e ∧ Sign = g)∨
(PrepC = d ∧ Sign = g) ∨ (PrepC = b ∧ Sign = f) ∨ (PrepC = b ∧ Sign = g))
where the first conjunct of SATE encodes the entailment constraint (¬Relatives, {ProcR}, {PrepC}),
the second encodes (¬Relatives, {ProcR}, {Log}) and the third encodes (¬Relatives, {PrepC}, {Sign}).
SATC : (ProcR 6= a ∨ (ci1,a ≥ 1 ∧ ci1,a ≤ 1)) ∧ (ProcR 6= b ∨ (ci1,b ≥ 1 ∧ ci1,b ≤ 1))∧
(ProcR 6= c ∨ (ci1,c ≥ 1 ∧ ci1,c ≤ 1)) ∧ (PrepC 6= b ∨ (ci1,b ≥ 1 ∧ ci1,b ≤ 1))∧
(PrepC 6= d ∨ (ci1,d ≥ 1 ∧ ci1,d ≤ 1)) ∧ (PrepC 6= e ∨ (ci1,e ≥ 1 ∧ ci1,e ≤ 1))
∧
(Log 6= d ∨ (ci2,d ≥ 1 ∧ ci2,d ≤ 1)) ∧ (Log 6= e ∨ (ci2,e ≥ 1 ∧ ci2,e ≤ 1))∧
(PrepC 6= b ∨ (ci2,b ≥ 1 ∧ ci2,b ≤ 1)) ∧ (PrepC 6= d ∨ (ci2,d ≥ 1 ∧ ci2,d ≤ 1))∧
(PrepC 6= e ∨ (ci2,e ≥ 1 ∧ ci2,e ≤ 1))
where the first conjunct of SATC encodes the counting constraint (1, 1, {ProcR, PrepC}) = i1,
whereas the second encodes (1, 1, {Log, PrepC}) = i2.
Summing up, the core of G = 〈L,Σ, I, δ, q0,Γ0, F 〉 of our example is:
• L = {Turn1, Turn2, Res}.
• I = {ProcR, Log, PrepC, Sign, aa, ab, ac, ad, ae, af, ag, ci1,a, ci1,b, ci1,c, ci1,d, ci1,e, ci2,b, ci2,d, ci2,e, k},
where dom(t) = {0, a, b, c, d, e, f, g} for each t ∈ T , dom(au) = {0, 1} for each u ∈ U ,
dom(ci,u) = {0, . . . , |T1|} for each (x, y, T1) ∈ C and u ∈
⋃
t∈T1 A(t1), and dom(k) = {0, . . . , k}.
• δ = {(Turn2, OVER ∧ SATE ∧ SATC, win, {}, Res)}.
• `0 = Turn1.
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Turn1
start
Turn2
Res
〈>, gain, {}〉
〈OVER ∧ SATE ∧ SATC, win, {}〉
. . .
〈. . . , t2u, . . . 〉
. . .
. . .
〈. . . , remu, . . . 〉
. . .
Figure 3: Skeleton of the encoding for static resiliency checking. Turn1 is the initial location. remu
transitions make users absent (environment). t2u transitions assign tasks to users (controller).
gain allows the controller to play once the environment has finished making users absent, whereas
win allows the controller to move to Res when all tasks have been executed and all constraints
are satisfied. The environment takes uncontrollable transitions (dashed red edges), whereas the
controller takes controllable ones (solid green edges).
• Γ0 = {ProcR 7→ 0, Log 7→ 0, PrepC 7→ 0, Sign 7→ 0, aa 7→ 1, ab 7→ 1, ac 7→ 1, ad 7→ 1, ae 7→
1, af 7→ 1, ag 7→ 1, ci1,a 7→ 0, ci1,b 7→ 0, ci1,c 7→ 0, ci1,d 7→ 0, ci1,e 7→ 0, ci2,b 7→ 0, ci2,d 7→
0, ci2,e 7→ 0, k 7→ 0}.
• F = {Res}. 
4.2 Static Resiliency
Figure 3 shows the skeleton of the encoding of an ACWF into an EGA for the static resiliency
checking. The encoding adds the following transitions to the core part of the EGA discussed in
Section 4.1.
To make a user u absent, we add an uncontrollable self loop transition at Turn1 having the form
〈Turn1, k < k ∧ au = 1, remu, {au := 0, k := k + 1}, Turn1〉
We have as many of these transitions as the number of users in U . The environment can take any of
these transitions if it can still remove further users (k < k) and the user it is trying to remove is still
available (au = 1). If this is possible, the state of the integer variable au modeling the availability
of that user is flipped to 0 (meaning that u has become absent) and the current number of absent
users k is incremented by 1.
Since uncontrollable transitions have priority over controllable ones, the environment can remove
as many users as it wants (up to k) before the controller gets control of the game by taking gain
(i.e., executing the gain transition) whose guard and update are:
〈Turn1,>, gain, {}, Turn2〉
The guard is always true, whereas the update makes no effect on Γ.
To assign a task t to a user u, we add a controllable self loop transition at Turn2 having the
form
〈Turn2, t = 0 ∧ au = 1 ∧Π(t), t2u, {t := u, cij ,u := cij ,u + 1, . . . }, Turn2〉
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Turn1
start
Turn2
Res
〈>, gain, {done := 0}〉
〈done = 1 ∧ ¬OVER, pass, {
Dynamic
resiliency only︷ ︸︸ ︷
au := 1, . . . , k := 0}〉
〈OVER ∧ SATE ∧ SATC, win, {}〉
. . .
〈. . . , t2u, . . . 〉
. . .
. . .
〈. . . , remu, . . . 〉
. . .
Figure 4: Skeleton of the encodings for decremental and dynamic resiliency. These encodings both
add the variable done and the transition pass to regulate the two turns of the game, extend the
guards and updates of t2u and remu transitions and only differ from each other for the update of
the pass transition that in case of dynamic resiliency resets the availability state of all users.
and we have as many of them as the cardinality of the authorization relation A. The controller can
assign t ∈ T to u ∈ A(t) if pi(t) is still undefined (modeled by t = 0) and u is available (modeled
by au = 1). Furthermore, t can be executed iff all tasks t
′ occurring before it have already been
executed. We model this latter condition as:
Π(t) :
∧
t′<t
t′ 6= 0
Example 9. For Sign2grace we have Π(Sign) : Log 6= 0 ∧ PrepC 6= 0. 
The update of this transition assigns t to u and increments all counters ci,u related to any
counting constraint (x, y, T1) = i such that t appears in T1 and u is authorized for t.
4.3 Decremental and Dynamic Resiliency
The encodings for decremental and dynamic resiliency both extend that for static resiliency and
differ from each other just for the update of a single transition. We show their skeleton(s) in
Figure 4.
We add an integer variable done having bounded domain dom(done) = {0, 1} and initially set
to 0. We use done to guarantee that at any round (i) the controller assigns one and only one task
to a user, and (ii) the environment waits for the controller to finish (Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3).
We extend the gain transition given in Figure 3 as follows
〈Turn1,>, gain, {done := 0}, Turn2〉
In this way, every time the run gets to Turn1, the controller can execute one task only as we extend
t2u transitions by refining the guard and update as follows
〈Turn2, t = 0 ∧ done = 0 ∧ au = 1 ∧ Π(t), t2u,
{t := u, cij ,u := cij ,u + 1, . . . , done := 1}, Turn2〉
That is, each of these transitions can be taken only if all conditions discussed for the encoding given
for static resiliency hold and furthermore the controller has not played yet in its turn (modeled by
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done = 0). Once such a transition is taken, the update sets done to 1 (modeling “controller has
played”) to prevent him from taking more than one.
We add a controllable transition pass going from Turn2 to Turn1 to lead the run back to Turn1
and allow the environment to remove further (or different in case of dynamic resiliency) users after
the controller has finished playing. Note that the environment cannot prevent the controller from
playing since pass requires in its guard done = 1. This transition is the only difference between
the encodings for decremental and dynamic resiliency.
In case of decremental resiliency this transition is:
〈Turn2, done = 1 ∧ ¬OVER, pass, {}, Turn1〉
whereas in case of dynamic resiliency it becomes:
〈Turn2, done = 1 ∧ ¬OVER, pass, {au := 1, . . . , k := 0}, Turn1〉
where {au := 1, . . . } is a sequence of statements operating on Γ to make all users available again
and the statement k := 0 resets the counter of current absent users. remu transitions remain the
same as those of the encoding given for static resiliency.
Finally, regardless of the type, static, decremental or dynamic resiliency is checked by looking
for a control strategy to always eventually get to Res. If the workflow is resilient, a strategy for the
controller exists and it is a certificate of “yes” modeling a dynamic plan pi. If the workflow is not
resilient, then a strategy for the environment exists and it is a certificate of “no”. Such strategy
allows the environment to break any execution no matter which tasks we decide to assign to which
users (we will always fail).
Figure 5 shows the EGA encoding the workflow in Figure 1 for dynamic resiliency.
5 Correctness and Complexity of the Encodings
In this section, we prove that each encoding discussed in Section 4 reduces any ACWF to an EGA
in polynomial time and correctly models the corresponding kind of addressed resiliency by showing
that any run of the generated EGA corresponds to a run of the corresponding game defined by
Wang and Li.
Before proceeding we clarify what we mean with correctness. An algorithm is correct if, once
run on some input, it returns a correct answer for that input. An answer may be Yes/No (for
decision problems) or a solution of some kind (e.g., a model for a CNF formula, an execution plan
for a resilient workflow, etc.). Our approach relies on sound and complete algorithms (TCTL model
checking) and corresponds to a reachability problem for extended game automata. If our approach
says that a workflow is resilient, then the workflow is really so and we prove it by returning an
execution plan as a “certificate of yes”. If a workflow is not resilient, then our approach returns
“breakable” meaning that there is no way to always satisfy the constraints during execution.
5.1 Static resiliency
Theorem 1. The encoding for static resiliency given in Section 4.2 generates an EGA G in polyno-
mial time such that the existence of a control strategy for G to always eventually get to Res implies
static resiliency of the starting workflow. 
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Proof. Given a workflow 〈T,U,, A,C〉, the encoding for static resiliency given in Section 4.2
generates an EGA G = 〈L,Σ, I, δ, q0,Γ0, F 〉 consisting of 3 locations, |T | integer variables for tasks
each one having a domain of |U |+ 1 elements, |U | integer variables for the availability of users each
one having a binary domain, |C ′| × |U | integer variables for counting constraints each one having
a maximum domain of |T | + 1 elements and where C ′ ⊆ C is the subset of counting constraints
and 1 integer variable for the current number of absent users having a domain of k + 1 elements.
Then, it generates |A| transitions to assign tasks to users (where each transition can have an update
containing all possible counters in the worst case), |U | transitions to make users absent, 1 pass
transition and 1 win transition. The win transition contains the guard OVER ∧ SATE ∧ SATC where
OVER contains |T | conjuncts, SATE contains a formula whose size is
∑
(ρ,T1,T2)∈C(1 + |{(u1, u2) |
(u1, u2) ∈ ρ∧ t1 ∈ T1 ∧ t2 ∈ T2 ∧ u1 ∈ A(t1)∧ u2 ∈ A(t2)}|) and SATC contains a formula whose size
is
∑
(x,y,T1)∈C(
∑
t∈T1 |A(t)|). Since all these pieces are functions computable in polynomial time,
the overall complexity is polynomial.
As we have already said at the end of Section 3.2, the state of this EGA is a pair (`,Γ), where
` is a location and Γ the status of the integer variables.
Turn1 is the initial location, where the environment plays. The initial state of the system is
(Turn1,Γ0), where Γ0 contains all initialized integer variables (see the end of Section 4).
When the run starts, the environment can make absent as many users as it likes (up to k)
by taking the remu-transitions. Every time the environment takes one of these transitions, k is
incremented by 1. Since all remu transitions are uncontrollable, the controller is unable to interrupt
the environment by taking gain (the unique controllable transition having source at Turn1). When
the environment is done, the controller can take gain to enter Turn2, the location in which it can
assign tasks to (available) users. When the controller enters Turn2, the current state of the system
is (Turn2,Γi), where in Γi we have that k ≤ k, au = 0 for each user u made absent, whereas the
ci,u and t variables are still the same as those in Γ0.
This state corresponds to choosing Absent ⊂ U such that |Absent| ≤ k (Algorithm 1, lines 1-2).
Now, at Turn2, the environment will not play anymore. In this location, the controller can assign
(unexecuted) tasks to (available) users by taking one and only one t2u transition corresponding
to a pair (t, u) ∈ A. These transitions also specify conditions on predecessors (if any)3. When the
controller is done (i.e., when all t2u transitions are disabled), the run can end up in two possible
states.
The first possibility is the state (Turn2,Γ′n), where Γ′n contains k ≤ k, ci,u is set to a specific
integer constant and au is set to 0 for each user made absent according to the specific run and
t = 0 for some t ∈ T . If this is the case, it means that for some task t there is no authorized and
available user u such that the partial plan extended with t = u would lead to a complete consistent
one. In other words, the workflow is breakable if the environment removes all users u such that
au = 0 in Γ
′
n before starting.
The second possibility is the state (Turn2,Γ′′n), where Γ′′n contains k ≤ k, ci,u is set to a specific
integer constant and au is set to 0 for each user made absent according to the specific run and
t 6= 0 for all t ∈ T . If this is the case, it means that all tasks have been assigned to a user.
The environment generates such an assignment according to the precedence relation  and the
related constraints. However, this plan is not necessarily consistent as it only verifies that (i) the
plan is valid (as (t, u) ∈ A for all t = u) and (ii) all tasks are executed according to the partial
3This is an optimization to speed up the model checking phase pruning impossible runs. Removing this optimiza-
tion would slow down the model checking phase but would not destroy the correctness of the approach.
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order . Now, if the controller can take the win-transition, then it means that OVER, SATE and
SATC valuates to true. That is, it means that a consistent plan pi exists and that the workflow is
statically resilient (Algorithm 1, lines 3-4). If the controller can’t take the win-transition, then it
means that the workflow is breakable as there is no way to satisfy the constraints with any of the
possible assignments under the absence of the users removed by the environment (Algorithm 1,
lines 3 and 5-6).
Static resiliency is not a matter of which order we choose for the tasks (we just need to make
sure that one exists) because users are removed before starting.
5.2 Decremental resiliency
Theorem 2. The encoding for decremental resiliency given in Section 4.3 generates an EGA G in
polynomial time such that the existence of a control strategy for G to always eventually get to Res
implies decremental resiliency of the starting workflow. 
Proof. For decremental resiliency the state of the EGA also contains an integer variable done that
is used to regulate the interplay of the game between the controller and the environment and a
pass transition to allow the environment to remove users also during execution. The complexity
remains polynomial as it adds only conditions related to related done in some guards and updates.
As for static resiliency, when the run is in Turn1, the environment can take as many remu
transitions as it likes before starting. However, since the encoding for decremental resiliency adds
pass to lead the run back to Turn1, the environment can make users absent also during execution.
Therefore, all Γs discussed for static resiliency extend by adding the variable done; for instance,
in (Turn1,Γ0) we have that Γ0 is as for static plus done = 1.
When the environment is done in his turn, the controller can take gain to enter Turn2.
At Turn2, before the controller starts playing, the current state of the system is (Turn2,Γi),
where Γi is like Γ0 with the difference that done = 0 (note that gain sets done to 0 in its update).
This corresponds to (extending) the set of absent users (Algorithm 2, lines 5-7).
At Turn2, the controller can make one assignment only as all t2u guards extend by adding
the clause done = 0 and all updates set done to 1. This corresponds to extending the partial
plan pi with one assignment only (Algorithm 2, line 8). Note that this assignment (if any) doesn’t
guarantee consistency. However, this is not a problem since if the run eventually gets to Res, then
it must have made an assignment such that pi was locally consistent. Note that the assignment of
tasks to users leads to a valid plan by default since t2u transitions exist only for pairs (t, u) ∈ A.
Therefore, such an assignment models Algorithm 2, lines 12-13.
The pass transition allows the controller to lead the run back to Turn1. However, this transition
cannot prevent the controller from making his assignment at Turn2 because pass will be enable
only when the controller is done (i.e., when it has taken a transition) and there is still some task to
assign (done = 1∧¬OVER). At Turn1, the environment can again make absent a few more users (if
any are left for this operation). When the environment is done with this turn (i.e., when it decides
not to make any further user absent), gain allows the controller to take back control of the run
by moving to Turn2 and make the next assignment. This run ends when assignments of tasks to
users are no longer possible. As for static resiliency, this happens for two possibilities: (Turn2,Γ′n)
and (Turn2,Γ′′n), where (Turn2,Γ′n) contains k ≤ k, ci,u is set to a specific integer constant and au
is set to 0 for each user made absent according to the specific run, done = 0 and t = 0 for some
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t ∈ T , whereas (Turn2,Γ′′n) contains k ≤ k, ci,u is set to a specific integer constant and au is set to
0 for each user made absent according to the specific run, done = 1 and t 6= 0 for some t ∈ T .
In any of these two states the run cannot go back to Turn1 as done = 0 (and no action of the
controller sets it to 1). In the first case, the workflow is breakable, whereas in the second case, the
workflow might be resilient (if the run can move to Res).
It is currently unclear if decremental resiliency is a matter of order or not mainly because users
may turn absent during execution, so we are not guaranteed that all total orderings for the tasks
precomputed before starting are fine. What is worse is that it could not be a problem of finding the
correct total order before starting, but such an order might have to be generated dynamically while
executing depending on which users are absent (see below what we found for dynamic resiliency).
In any case, the encoding for decremental resiliency doesn’t fix any total ordering, so if an ACWF
is proven decrementally resilient, the synthesized strategy will also implicitly handle this issue.
5.3 Dynamic resiliency
Theorem 3. The encoding for dynamic resiliency given in Section 4.3 generates an EGA G in
polynomial time such that the existence of a control strategy for G to always eventually get to Res
implies dynamic resiliency of the starting workflow.
Proof. The encoding for dynamic resiliency refines that for decremental resiliency by adding the
restore of the availability of the users (1 statement for each user) and the reset of k in the update
of pass (i.e., at the end of any turn). Therefore its complexity remains polynomial as it extends
the update of pass of |U |+ 1 components. Everything else remains the same.
Dynamic resiliency is a matter of order. Consider the total order ProcR  PrepC  Log  Sign
and assume that the controller (no matter which user is absent before starting the execution) assigns
either alice or charlie to ProcR (and not bob since this assignment would only leave emma for
Log). Regardless of which user the controller assigns to ProcR, the environment will make absent
bob before PrepC is assigned. Then, since PrepC and Log must be assigned to two different users,
if the controller assigns PrepC to emma, the environment will put back bob and make absent david,
whereas if the controller assigns PrepC to david, then the controller will put back bob and remove
emma (both before the assignment of Log). In this way, the only user remaining for Log will be the
one who was assigned to PrepC. In such a scenario, this problem doesn’t happen if Log executes
before PrepC.
Consider now the total order ProcR  Log  PrepC  Sign and assume that bob is absent before
the execution. We can assign ProcR to either alice or charlie. Regardless of this assignment, the
environment will put back bob and make absent emma forcing the controller to assign Log to david.
Then, the environment will put back david and make absent bob again forcing the controller to
assign PrepC to emma. Finally, the environment will put back bob and make absent grace so that
frank is the only user remaining for Sign. But since PrepC was assigned to emma and emma is
frank’s daughter, no valid user has remained for Sign. And, of course, in this other scenario the
problem doesn’t occur if PrepC executes before Log.
Therefore, in dynamic resiliency the order of assigning tasks to users is definitely dynamic.
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6 Erre: A Tool for Workflow Resiliency
We developed Erre, the first tool for workflow resiliency that relies on a controller synthesis
approach for the three kinds of resiliency.4 Erre is written in Java and acts both as a solver (by
internally relying on UPPAAL-TIGA to synthesize winning strategies for EGAs) and as an executor
simulator (i.e., a real time planner). Listing 1 shows Erre’s help screen.
Listing 1: Erre’s help screen.
Usage: java -jar erre.jar <Workflow.wf> <Action> <static|decremental|dynamic> <k> <Workflow.s> [N] [--silent]
<Action>:
--check internally encodes the workflow in input into an UPPAAL-TIGA specification ready to check static,
decremental or dynamic resiliency up to k users (saves the strategy to Workflow.s)
--execute performs [N] (default 1) executions of the workflow in input (if resilient) according to the
strategy (.s) synthesized by UPPAAL-TIGA.
--silent suppresses output (optional)
Examples:
java -jar erre.jar CaseStudy.wf --check dynamic 2 CaseStudy.s
java -jar erre.jar CaseStudy.wf --execute dynamic 2 CaseStudy.s 10
Given an ACWF 〈T,U,, A,C〉, the input language of Erre has a well-defined context-free
grammar (BNF) so as to allow yet-to-be-developed (GUI) tools to write input specifications auto-
matically. Such a language comprises four main sections:
1. Users {...} specifying U .
2. Tasks {...} specifying T and A.
3. Precedence {...} specifying .
4. Constraints {...} specifying C.
As an example of Erre’s input language, Listing 2 shows the specification of the ACWF in
Figure 1.
Listing 2: Specification of the ACWF in Figure 1.
1 # Figure 1 - The loan origination process
2 Users {
3 a b c d e f g # i.e., alice, bob, charlie, david, emma, frank, grace
4 }
5
6 Tasks {
7 (ProcR : a b c) # i.e. A(ProcR) = {alice,bob,charlie}
8 (Log : d e) # i.e. A(Log) = {david,emma}
9 (PrepC : b d e) # i.e. A(PrepC) = {bob,david,emma}
10 (Sign : f g) # i.e. A(ProcR) = {frank,grace}
11 }
12
13 Precedence {
14 (ProcR <= Log) # i.e., ProcR is before Log
15 (ProcR <= PrepC) # i.e., ProcR is before PrepC
16 (Log <= Sign) # i.e., Log is before Sign
4The name of the tool comes from the sound of the letter “r” (for resiliency) in Italian.
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17 (PrepC <= Sign) # i.e., PrepC is before Sign
18 }
19
20 Constraints {
21 # Entailment between ProC and Log (not relatives)
22 ((a a) (a b) (a c) (a d) (a e) (a f) (a g) (b a) (b b) (b c) (b e) (b f) (b g) (c a) (c b) (c c) (c d) (c e)
(c f) (c g) (d a) (d c) (d d) (d e) (d f) (d g) (e a) (e b) (e c) (e d) (e e) (e g) (f a) (f b) (f c) (
f d) (f f) (f g) (g a) (g b) (g c) (g d) (g e) (g f) (g g) : ProcR : Log)
23
24 # Entailment between ProC and Sign (not relatives)
25 ((a a) (a b) (a c) (a d) (a e) (a f) (a g) (b a) (b b) (b c) (b e) (b f) (b g) (c a) (c b) (c c) (c d) (c e)
(c f) (c g) (d a) (d c) (d d) (d e) (d f) (d g) (e a) (e b) (e c) (e d) (e e) (e g) (f a) (f b) (f c) (
f d) (f f) (f g) (g a) (g b) (g c) (g d) (g e) (g f) (g g) : ProcR : PrepC)
26
27 # Entailment between PrepC and Sign (not relatives)
28 ((a a) (a b) (a c) (a d) (a e) (a f) (a g) (b a) (b b) (b c) (b e) (b f) (b g) (c a) (c b) (c c) (c d) (c e)
(c f) (c g) (d a) (d c) (d d) (d e) (d f) (d g) (e a) (e b) (e c) (e d) (e e) (e g) (f a) (f b) (f c) (
f d) (f f) (f g) (g a) (g b) (g c) (g d) (g e) (g f) (g g) : PrepC : Sign)
29
30 # Counting constraint between ProcR and PrepC (separation of duty)
31 (1 : 1 : ProcR PrepC)
32
33 # Counting constraint between Log and PrepC (separation of duty)
34 (1 : 1 : Log PrepC)
35 }
To check static, decremental and dynamic resiliency of the ACWF in Figure 1 (up to 1 absent
user), we ran Erre on Listing 2. We used a FreeBSD virtual machine run on top of a VMWare
ESXi Hypervisor using a physical machine equipped with an Intel i7 2.80GHz and 20GB of RAM.
The VM was assigned 16GB of RAM and full CPU power. Erre proved in '350ms that the ACWF
in Figure 1 is statically resilient saving a dynamic plan of 8Kb (101-action strategy), decrementally
resilient saving a dynamic plan of 8Kb (90-action strategy), and also dynamically resilient5 saving
a dynamic plan of 12Kb (141-action strategy). Details are given in Listing 3.
Listing 3: Validation of the ACWF in Figure 1 for static, decremental and dynamic resiliency.
1 $ java -jar erre.jar Fig1.wf --check static 1 Fig1.sta.s
2 Resiliency level = 1 (static)
3 k = 1
4 Checking Fig1.wf with UPPAAL-TIGA
5 Running UPPAAL-TIGA ...
6 Saving a 101-action strategy to Fig1.sta.s
7
8 $ java -jar erre.jar Fig1.wf --check decremental 1 Fig1.dec.s
9 Resiliency level = 2 (decremental)
10 k = 1
11 Checking Fig1.wf with UPPAAL-TIGA
12 Running UPPAAL-TIGA ...
13 Saving a 90-action strategy to Fig1.dec.s
14
15 $ java -jar erre.jar Fig1.wf --check dynamic 1 Fig1.dyn.s
16 Resiliency level = 3 (dynamic)
17 k = 1
18 Checking Fig1.wf with UPPAAL-TIGA
19 Running UPPAAL-TIGA ...
20 Saving a 141-action strategy to Fig1.dyn.s
5We invite the reader to add either (Log <= PrepC) or (PrepC <= Log) to the Precedence section of the speci-
fication shown in Listing 2 to reproduce the scenarios in which the workflow becomes breakable as discussed at the
end of Section 4 (see below for the link to download the case study).
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When an ACWF W is proved resilient up to a certaint k, Erre saves to file (.s) the dynamic plan
(i.e., the execution strategy) needed to later execute it (validate once, execute anytime). Such a
plan can be used to execute the workflow for all k′ ≤ k and all kinds of entailed resiliency (see
below and Listing 5). For each kind of resiliency, we executed the ACWF in Figure 1 10000 times
(Listing 4).
Listing 4: Carrying out 10000 execution simulations of the ACWF in Figure 1 with respect to static
(1), decremental (2) and dynamic resiliency (3).
$ java -jar erre.jar Fig1.wf --execute static 1 Fig1.sta.s 10000
...
$ java -jar erre.jar Fig1.wf --execute decremental 1 Fig1.dec.s 10000
...
$ java -jar erre.jar Fig1.wf --execute dynamic 1 Fig1.dyn.s 10000
...
When going for the execution simulation, we can pass to Erre an optional parameter [N] as
the last command line argument to carry out a specific number of random simulations. If N = 0,
then Erre will only load the strategy, whereas if N = 10000 (as in Listing 4), then Erre will load
the strategy (once) and carry out 10000 execution simulations. By default, N = 1. Note that since
dynamic resiliency embeds decremental and static resiliency, we can also use a dynamic strategy
to carry out random simulations focusing only on decremental or static resiliency, or we can use a
decremental strategy focusing only on static resiliency (Listing 5).
Listing 5: Using a single strategy for executing an ACWF with respect to different kinds of resiliency.
$ java -jar erre.jar Fig1.wf --execute decremental 1 Fig1.dyn.s 10000
...
$ java -jar erre.jar Fig1.wf --execute static 1 Fig1.dyn.s 10000
...
$ java -jar erre.jar Fig1.wf --execute static 1 Fig1.dec.s 10000
...
However, in no case we can use a static strategy for a decremental or dynamic execution (even if the
ACWF is resilient for those kinds of resiliency), or a decremental strategy for a dynamic execution.
Listing 6 shows the output of a few execution simulations for static, decremental and dynamic
resiliency of Figure 1 (according to the commands given in Listing 4). This example, along with
Erre and the experimental evaluation that we are about to discuss, is available at the URL
https://github.com/matteozavatteri/erre.
Having Erre also allowed us to carry out an experimental evaluation against a set of random
ACWFs. We recall that no other tool provides exact algorithms for all three kinds of resiliency
(especially dynamic) for the class of constraints we consider, so Erre also advances the state of the
art by providing experimental data for future comparisons. We generated 1000 ACWFs partitioned
in 5 sets of benchmarks each one containing 100 dynamically resilient workflows (up to 2 absent
users) and 100 dynamically breakable workflows (for 2 absent users). The first set 2t6u2a/ specifies
workflows with 2 tasks, the second set 3t6u2a/ specifies workflows with 3 tasks and so on, up to
the fifth one 6t6u2a/ that specifies workflows with 6 tasks. Regardless of the set, each workflow
has exactly 6 users authorized for all tasks, at least an entailment constraint and at least a counting
constraint. Furthermore, each workflow doesn’t specify any partial order. Again, authorizing all
users for all tasks and not restricting the partial order contributes to generating hard instances (N
unordered tasks have N ! possible orders).
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Listing 6: Execution simulations for static, decremental and dynamic resiliency. Every line in the
execution starts with either E: meaning “environment plays” or C: meaning “controller plays”.
For static resiliency (first simulation) frank is absent before the execution starts. For decremental
resiliency (second simulation) nobody is absent until Log finishes and charlie becomes absent after
Log. For dynamic resiliency (third simulation) david is absent before starting and arrives after
ProcR and emma becomes absent after PrepC and comes back after Log.
1 Static Resiliency | Decremental Resiliency | Dynamic Resiliency
2 k = 1 | k = 1 | k = 1
3 Execution 1 | Execution 1 | Execution 1
4 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 E: Absent = {f} | E: Absent = {} | E: Absent = {d}
6 C: ProcR = a | C: ProcR = a | C: ProcR = a
7 C: Log = d | E: Absent = {} | E: Absent = {}
8 C: PrepC = b | C: Log = d | C: PrepC = b
9 C: Sign = g | E: Absent = {c} | E: Absent = {e}
10 | C: PrepC = b | C: Log = d
11 | E: Absent = {c} | E: Absent = {}
12 | C: Sign = f | C: Sign = f
13 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 Verifying ... SAT! | Verifying ... SAT! | Verifying ... SAT!
Algorithm 4 shows the pseudo-code of the generator. In the following we discuss the data we
collected.
Figure 6a shows the graphical results of the experimental evaluation in which we focused on
time, where x-axes always represent the number of tasks (i.e., the set of benchmarks under analysis)
and y-axes represent the average time elapsed when analyzing the instances in that set. We ran
Erre on these sets of benchmarks without imposing any timeout. For resilient workflows, we ran
the analysis for static, decremental and dynamic resiliency on dynamically resilient workflows up
to 2 absent users. For every color, the dashed line refers to the checking time to synthesize the
strategy in memory, whereas the solid line refers to the total time to save it to disk (our test
machine is not equipped with a solid state disk). For breakable workflows we run the analysis for
dynamic resiliency for 2 absent users. We note that static resiliency is the easiest one to check,
whereas there is not much difference between decremental and dynamic resiliency. Breaking an
ACWF dynamically is easier than validating it (the analysis fails early).
Figure 6b shows the average number of actions in the specific strategies with respect to the set
of benchmarks and the type of resiliency. Again, static strategies contain fewer actions, whereas
decremental and dynamic ones contain of course more.
Figure 6c shows how long it takes on average to load in memory the strategies from disk of
resilient workflows and then carry out 10000 random execution simulations (dashed lines). Loading
time is of course the bottleneck as we are loading an exponential-size strategy from a (typically
“slow”) mass storage device. We can see that since the strategies are memoryless (and implemented
in Erre as hashtables “state → action”) the execution is efficient (solid lines). Overall, Erre
simulated 15,000,000 of random executions. No one crashed.
Finally, Figure 6d shows the average space (on disk) consumed to save the strategies for dy-
namically resilient workflows.
25
Algorithm 4: ACWF-Gen(n, u, e, c)
Input: An exact number of tasks n, and exact number of users u, a maximum number of
entailment constraints e, a maximum number of counting constraints c.
Output: An ACWF according to Definition 1.
1 W ← 〈T,U,, A,C〉 . Empty ACWF
. Generate tasks
2 T ← {ti | 1 ≤ i ≤ t}
3 U ← {ui | 1 ≤ i ≤ u}
. Generate authorization relation
4 for t ∈ T do
5 A(t) = U
. Generate entailment constraints
6 for i = 1 to e do
7 ρ← a sample of u22 random tuples from U × U
8 T1 ← a sample of random tasks from T (minimum 1)
9 T2 ← a sample of random tasks from T (minimum 1)
10 Generate a random Boolean b
11 if b = > then
12 T2 ← T2 \ T1
13 else
14 T1 ← T1 \ T2
15 if ρ 6= ∅ ∧ T1 6= ∅ ∧ T2 6= ∅∧ 6 ∃(ρ′, T ′1, T ′2) ∈ C s.t. T1 = T ′1 and T2 = T ′2 then
16 C ← C ∪ {(ρ, T1, T2)}
17 for i = 1 to c do
18 x← random integer in [1, 2]
19 y ← random integer in [x, x+ 1]
20 T1 ← a sample of random tasks from T (min 2 and max |T |2 )
21 if 6 ∃(x′, y′, T ′1) ∈ C s.t. T1 ⊆ T ′1 or T ′1 ⊆ T1 then
22 C ← C ∪ {(x, y, T1)}
23 if no (ρ, T1, T2) ∈ C or no (x, y, T1) ∈ C then
24 Throw away W
25 else
26 return W
7 Related Work
In [5], Wang and Li proposed a role-and-relation based model (R2BAC) for workflow systems and
studied the complexity bounds of workflow satisfiability and resiliency. Their experimental evalu-
ation focuses on the workflow satisfiability problem WSP, analyzing randomly generated workflow
instances that differ for the number of users (1000 to 5000), or the number of tasks (10 to 40) or
the number of constraints (10 to 80). Furthermore, R2BAC does not consider counting constraints.
In contrast, we gave exact algorithms to check static, decremental and dynamic resiliency and also
simulate executions of resilient workflows specifying both entailment and counting constraints [22].
In [29], Li et al. introduced the notion of resiliency policies in the context of access control
systems and defined the resiliency checking problem (RCP), i.e., whether an access control state
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Figure 6: Some data from the experimental evaluation with Erre.
satisfies a given resiliency policy. They studied the complexity bound of the RCP and provided
a SAT-based approach for RCP. Their experimental evaluation involves random instances with 60
to 80 users, 10 permissions and a maximum number of 3 absent users. RCP always means static
resiliency, whereas we also addressed decremental and dynamic resiliency.
In [30], Crampton et al. studied the Valued WSP to find the “least bad” plan; i.e., a plan that
maximizes the number of satisfied constraints. Their experimental evaluation considers workflows
with numbers of tasks ranging from 10 to 60 tasks; they analyze these workflows by comparing a
pattern branch and bound (PBB) algorithm and a mixed integer programming (MIP) algorithm.
Workflow resiliency is not addressed. After that, Crampton et al. [13] also proposed the BI-objective
WSP as a generalization of [30]. In this case, their experimental evaluation involves workflows with
numbers of tasks ranging from 10 to 36. Our work doesn’t follow a “max-SAT” approach, but
provides exact algorithms for static, decremental and dynamic resiliency.
In [31], Khan and Fong defined workflow feasibility (availability in some state) as the dual of
workflow resiliency (availability in every state). Our work is incomparable as it doesn’t tackle
feasibility.
Some probabilistic approaches have been proposed to tackle resiliency. These approaches are
typically faster than our approach, but, in a nutshell, that’s because they may fail whereas our
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approach doesn’t and is exact. In particular, in [10], Mace et al. introduced the quantitative
workflow resiliency as a metric of probability on how likely a workflow terminates given a security
policy and a user availability model. They do so by solving a Markov Decision Process and their
experimental evaluation takes into account workflows with numbers of tasks ranging from 1 to 10.
Afterwards, in [11], Mace et al. provided WRAD, a tool for workflow resiliency analysis and design
that encodes a workflow specification into the PRISM model checker. Workflow resiliency is defined
as the maximum probability of finding a complete and valid plan. Their experimental evaluation
involves the running example discussed in the paper which is a single workflow specifying 5 tasks
and 3 users. Our approach cannot be used on that example because it is not probabilistic.
In [16], Paci et al. extended the RBAC-WS-BPEL language to support the specification of
resiliency constraints and provided an algorithm to check if a system is failure-resistant. Although
they use different terms, they deal with static resiliency only. Their experimental evaluation involves
four workflows having 21 tasks and a number of users ranging from 50 to 140 (first workflow) and
fixed to 50 (all other workflows). Their experimental data is not available, but, in any case, our
approach does not currently handle workflows of that order of magnitude (see also the discussion on
scalability in the conclusions). However, in contrast to their approach, our approach does handle
decremental and dynamic resiliency.
In [15], Lowalekar et al. provided failure resiliency while satisfying security policy and con-
straints. They considered both static and decremental resiliency, but left the investigation for
dynamic resiliency as future work. Their experimental evaluation involves randomly generated
workflows with size ranging from 5 to 50 tasks and from 5 to 50 users. The authors also state
that precedence relationships (with respect to the formalism they use) between tasks don’t break
resiliency. However, their approach doesn’t involve dynamic resiliency. In contrast, we dealt with
dynamic resiliency and carried out a discussion on the importance of the ordering.
In [12], Lu et al. studied the dynamic workflow adjustment, i.e., how to minimally adjust
existing task-user assignments, when a sudden change, such as the absence of users, occurs. No
experimental evaluation is provided. Again, we don’t modify anything; we go for unbreakable
security.
In [32], dos Santos et al. defined a class of Scenario Finding Problems, which are solutions
solving the WSP that also satisfy other properties (e.g., a minimal number of users must be present).
Their experimental evaluation involves two real world examples whose size are 7 tasks and 2 SoD
constraints, and 9 tasks and 3 SoD constraints, respectively. Afterwards, in [14], dos Santos et
al. solved static workflow resiliency by pre-computing reachability graphs by model checking the
system, but they didn’t address decremental resiliency nor dynamic resiliency. The experimental
evaluation involves the same two workflows considered in [32]. Again, while we do not provide a
comparison on these two examples for static resiliency as it would not be particularly meaningful,
we wish to remark that our approach also addresses decremental and dynamic resiliency.
In this paper we dealt with (dynamic) controllability analysis to answer the workflow resiliency
problem. Although focusing on slightly different areas, several papers studying dynamic controlla-
bility with or without employing (extended timed) game automata helped to devise our approach
(see for example, [?, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37] for an example of dynamic controllability of temporal
networks).
In [38], Combi et al. provided a language to model temporal plans and introduced security
constraints as a means to prevent users from executing tasks if a temporal constraint is violated.
Algorithms for satisfiability and resiliency are left for future work. After that, in [33], Combi et
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al. proposed Access Controlled Temporal Networks to model temporal plans (under temporal and
conditional uncertainty) augmented with users and authorization constraints. The assignment of
the users depends on how the uncontrollable parts behave (“dynamic WSP”). However, workflow
resiliency is left as future work. Instead, focusing on resource controllability only, in [6], Zavatteri et
al., proposed an initial approach to check weak, strong and dynamic controllability for access con-
trolled workflows under conditional uncertainty by mapping workflow paths to constraint networks
(CNs) [7] and reasoning on the intersection of common parts. The proposed approach pointed out
that dynamic controllability might be a matter of how the components of the workflow are ordered,
an hypothesis that was later confirmed by Zavatteri e Vigano` in [8, 9] with the proposal of constraint
networks under conditional uncertainty (CNCUs). The experimental evaluations of CNCUs can be
seen as evaluations for a conditional WSP (i.e., a WSP with uncontrollable XOR-splits considered).
Having made such an assumption, the size of these conditional workflows provided in [8] ranges
from 5 to 15 tasks (where 1 to 10 are uncontrollable XOR splits) and 10 to 30 authorized users for
each task, whereas the workflows provided in [9] have a fixed number of 6 tasks with the same 6
users authorized for each task, no partial order and a number of XOR-splits ranging from 1 to 6
(this shows again that even small instances can be hard). In this paper we have seen that workflow
resiliency shares with these latter works the matter of order. However, all these last works don’t
deal with the absence of resources.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
We started from the definitions (and corresponding games) provided by Wang and Li in [5, 4] for
static, decremental and dynamic workflow resiliency and we considered the class of constraints
defined in [22] (in [5, 4] counting constraints are not employed). We provided three encodings into
extended game automata to model these games, and we proved that our encodings are correct and
are generated in polynomial time. ACWFs that are resilient are (dynamically) satisfiable, the vice
versa does not hold in general. We employed Uppaal-TIGA as an off the shelf model checker for
solving these two-player reachability games. If the ACWF is resilient, i.e., if a winning strategy for
the controller exists, Uppaal-TIGA returns in output such a strategy. If the ACWF is breakable,
Uppaal-TIGA returns a counter-strategy for the environment allowing him to always break the
execution (i.e., prevent the controller from entering Res).
To automate the whole process, we developed Erre, the first tool for workflow resiliency relying
on controller synthesis. Erre allows for an automated model generation encoding into an EGA
a specification of an ACWF taken as input. Then, Erre internally relies on Uppaal-TIGA to
prove that the workflow is either resilient or breakable. If the ACWF is resilient, Erre compresses
(online) the strategy returned in output by Uppaal-TIGA and saves it to file. Finally, Erre also
allows one to carry out random execution simulations as (further) evidence that everything discussed
in this paper works correctly. On the one hand, Uppaal-TIGA guarantees that the algorithms
employed to answer the decision problem of workflow resiliency are sound and complete, on the
other hand Erre guarantees that the approach is fully automated from analysis to simulation. In
this way, we provided a usable approach even for designers with little or no knowledge on EGAs.
With Erre, we carried out a preliminary experimental evaluation against a set of benchmarks
we generated in order to compare time performances and space consumption of the three main
kinds of resiliency. We also made available online all the results of the experiments for the world
to compare. Scalability is a very interesting problem. We provided data to show that even small
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workflow instances can have characteristics that result in the model checking phase to blow up.
In our experimental evaluation, each workflow instance has 6 tasks and each task has the same 6
authorized users. Furthermore, no partial order is imposed. These characteristics allow the model
checking phase to explore a huge number of states. We could have provided workflows with more
tasks, imposing a total order and saying that the approach is (a bit more) scalable, but this would
not have been fully true and thus we decided not to. There are complexity bottlenecks in these
problems (more than a tool bottleneck). When any kind of resiliency is checked by setting k = 0,
all three encodings boil down to check classic workflow satisfiability (in that case, the encoding for
static is the best to use as it does not have any “game interplay” during execution).
Static resiliency is not a matter of order, whereas dynamic is so. It remains unclear if decremen-
tal resiliency is affected by that issue. Therefore, in addition to looking for further optimizations, fu-
ture work will target possible ordering problems in decremental resiliency. Another direction worth
following is that of investigating if static resiliency remains coNPNP-complete and if decremen-
tal and dynamic resiliency remain PSPACE-complete also with respect to the class of constraints
described in [22].
Our approach is relevant not just for the communities working on business processes and work-
flows and, more widely, artificial intelligence, but also for the security community. So, let us now
take stock of our results and clarify their significance for security. As we have already remarked,
ACWFs augment classic workflows by adding users and authorization constraints. Users execute
tasks, whereas authorization constraints specify which users are (still) authorized to execute the
remaining tasks depending on who did what. Therefore, authorization constraints are primitives
for the specification of security policies. Checking workflow satisfiability ensures that an assign-
ment of users to tasks satisfying all authorization constraints exists. Workflow satisfiability does
not consider the absence of users, therefore no execution of the ACWF breaks security (i.e., the
authorization constraints) if a consistent plan exists and it is followed.
However, when it comes to absent users, we need resiliency analysis to keep guaranteeing un-
breakable security. The approach in this paper validates ACWFs against the three well-known
types of resiliency defined by Wang and Li. As a result, our approach guarantees that no execution
breaks security if a dynamic plan exists and it is followed. If it broke them, our analysis would find
it out as in the model checking phase, we would be able to synthesize a counter-strategy for the
environment to break any execution. In this context, this counter-strategy can be seen as an attack
to the correct execution of the ACWF6 and/or to the security policies the workflow is supposed to
enforce. If no counter-strategy exists, it means that there exists a dynamic plan for the controller
able to react to any possible move of the environment always telling the controller the right move
to make in order to get to the end satisfying all authorization constraints (i.e., without breaking
security). Therefore, resilient workflows guarantee unbreakable security.
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